Abstract. Multivariate public key cryptography is one of the main approaches to guarantee the security of communication in a post-quantum world. One of the most promising candidates in this area is the Rainbow signature scheme, which was first proposed by J. Ding and D. Schmidt in 2005. In this paper we develop a model of security for the Rainbow signature scheme. We use this model to find parameters which, under certain assumptions, guarantee the security of the scheme for now and the near future.
Introduction
To guarantee the security of communication it is important to have fast and secure signature schemes. One major field of application for them is the authenticity of data and information, for example software updates.
One of the most promising candidates in this area is the Rainbow signature scheme, which was presented by J. Ding and D. Schmidt in [DS05] There have also been some attempts to derive appropriate parameters from the complexities of these attacks [CC08] . However, it is still an open problem how we have to adapt the parameters of multivariate schemes to future developments in cryptanalysis and computing power.
In this paper we try to answer this question for the Rainbow signature scheme. We start with the security model of Lenstra and Verheul [LV00] to compute necessary security levels for the years 2010 to 2050. After that we look at the known attacks against the Rainbow signature scheme and observe that the security of the scheme is mainly determined by two of them, namely the direct attack and the Rainbow-Band-Separation attack. We study the complexity of these two attacks, both with data from the literature and with own experiments, for which we use two of the most efficient available software packages, namely MAGMA and Singular. Finally, we use the results of these experiments to find appropriate parameters for Rainbow such that it fulfills the given security levels, as well as Rainbow schemes for limited hash sizes. One of our main results here is, that we need at least 26 equations to achieve the necessary security level for 2010. So, the often proposed scheme Rainbow(18,12,12) does not provide adequate security.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we describe the Rainbow signature scheme. Section 3 describes our model of security for the Rainbow scheme. In Section 4 we take a closer look at the complexities of the direct and the Rainbow-Band-Separation attack and present the results of our experiments. Section 5 gives secure parameter sets optimized for small public key sizes as well as Rainbow schemes for limited hash sizes. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Multivariate Public Key Cryptography
Multivariate Public Key Cryptography is one of the main approaches for secure communication in a post-quantum world. The principle idea is to choose a multivariate system F of quadratic polynomials which can be easily inverted (central map). After that one chooses two affine linear invertible maps S and T to hide the structure of the central map. The public key of the cryptosystem is the composed map P = S • F • T which is difficult to invert. The private key consists of S, F and T and therefore allows to invert P .
There are several ways to build the central map 
The Principle of Oil and Vinegar (OV)
One way to create easily invertible multivariate quadratic systems is the principle of Oil and Vinegar, which was first proposed by J. Patarin in [Pa97] .
Let K be a finite field (e.g. K = GF (2 8 )). Let o and v be two integers and set n = o + v. Patarin suggested to choose o = v. After this original scheme was broken by Kipnis and Shamir in [KS98] , it was recommended in [KP99] to
